We examine the impacts of British government 'stop-go' policy on domestic sales of consumer durables over 1952 -1965, via hire purchase restrictions and punitive Purchase Tax rates. Our analysis includes a general review of contemporary evidence regarding the impacts of these measures, a more detailed study of the television sector, and time-series econometric analysis for both televisions and a representative high-ticket labour-saving consumer durable -washing machines. We find that the restrictions had devastating impacts on Britain's consumer durables industries, preventing firms from fully exploiting economies of scale, reducing output growth and international competitiveness, and eroding industrial relations. Government officials were aware of these problems, but considered them a price worth paying to facilitate moves towards sterling convertibility and the re-establishment of the City as a leading financial and trading centre.
Introduction
From 1952 successive British governments used hire purchase (HP) restrictions and Purchase Tax on consumer durables as key instruments of consumer demand management.
i During the 1950s and early 1960s policy interventions were particularly severe, with the periodic imposition of tight HP controls and Purchase Tax rates of up to 66.67 per cent. These had reinforcing impacts, principally through raising the upfront 'price' facing the credit purchaser (the minimum HP deposit payment) -and were regarded by policy-makers as close substitutes.
ii While sometimes presented as an instrument of employment stabilisation, a key driver of demand management policy during this period was an over-riding priority among an influential section of policy-makers to restore sterling as a 'strong' currency (second only to the dollar) and re-establish the City as a major financial and trading centre, despite heavy war-time debts and low currency reserves. There has been substantial debate regarding whether this prioritisation of external stability over internal stability had a detrimental impact on British economic growth and industrial output. iii We focus more narrowly on the impact of stop-go on those industries primarily impacted by the HP and Purchase Tax restrictions -motor vehicles and household durables.
Although they represented only about eight per cent of consumer expenditure by the early 1960s
(and 12.0 per cent of 1963 manufacturing net output), consumer durables shouldered the main burden of consumption restrictions. iv As an official working party noted laconically, these controls operated on "such a narrow front [that] big changes in the controls have to be applied in order to produce the required change in demand. This produces great disturbances in the industries affected as well as great uncertainty." v The Treasury and Bank of England viewed consumer durables as relatively low priority sectors, as their ratio of exports to total sales was lower than for the staple industries -reflecting protectionism and different market requirements (such as alternative standards for mains voltages or television frequencies, or road conditions favouring higher horsepower cars).
vi However, in other respects these were important sectors. Rapid household diffusion of consumer durables in most western nations, together with falling unit costs owing to rapid process innovations and scale economies, made them important growth industries. vii Even in Britain (where government systematically restricted their growth during 'stop' phases of the economic cycle), gross output in the electrical appliances sector rose from £72 million in 1954 to £312 million in 1970; while gross output in motor vehicles expanded from £883 million to £3,306 million. viii Meanwhile the television and radio sector not only witnessed relatively rapid growth, but formed the bedrock of the wider electronics industry. Yet these characteristics also made them extremely vulnerable to unpredictable cuts in demand, which prevented plants from approaching full capacity and, in some sub-sectors subject to rapid product innovation, such as televisions, could lead to build-ups of excessive stocks that might become obsolete before the restrictions were lifted.
This article examines the extent to which stop-go policies contributed to the declining international competitiveness of these sectors. The first section outlines the evolution of government policy and the chronology of stop-go during the 1950s (which witnessed the greatest volatility in policy). We then examine contemporary evidence regarding the impacts of the restrictions, finding that they were widely perceived to have reduced potential scale economies;
depressed both home and export sales; created a cycle of short-time working or lay-offs followed by systematic overtime, which eroded industrial relations; and produced a climate of extreme uncertainty that wreaked havoc with long-term production planning and investment. We look in more detail at the major new 'consumer durables boom' product of this era, televisions, to determine whether firms were seeking to serve post-war demand through mass production and whether the restrictions thwarted these efforts. Finally, we undertake a quantitative analysis of the relationships between the policy restrictions and sales growth, for televisions and a representative high-ticket 'labour saving' durable, washing machines.
Section I
After 1951 Britain only suffered balance of payments deficits in two of the following ten years (1955 and 1960) . However, the pursuit of policies designed to restore Britain's international economic role, and the City's status as a leading financial and trading centre, led to strong conflicts between domestic industrial growth and external stability. Restoring the City's international status was perceived to require the resumption of sterling as a strong convertible currency with a major international role, an openness to capital inflows (including 'hot money'), substantial outward investment in the sterling area, and efforts to maintain Britain's great power status through historically high peacetime levels of defence expenditure (reflected in persistent public sector current account deficits). ix Given its low currency reserves, these policies made Britain particularly vulnerable to sterling crises (which, in practice, limited the extent to which they could be realised). were lifted production could not be expanded quickly enough to meet pent-up demand, leading to a boom in imports. Conversely, additions to capacity to meet rising demand could prove worthless following their unanticipated re-imposition. xl Instability in demand was also said to have reduced scale economies, by deterring investment and fostering a bias towards labourintensive production methods, which were more flexible to violent and unanticipated demand fluctuations. To explore these impacts in more detail, this section focuses on a particular product class.
Televisions are chosen as they were a high priority durable; lacked a significant trade-in market to cover deposits (owing to short lifespans and rapid technical obsolescence, driven by rising screen sizes) unlike, for example, motor vehicles; and were an expensive item throughout this period, with all models priced well above the normal ceiling for cash purchases. However, they were typical of household durables in terms of their HP restrictions and Purchase Tax rates.
Britain had been a leading television pioneer, with the world's first regular high definition television service, from 1936. Surviving firm-level evidence indicates that during the early postwar years leading manufacturers were committed to mass production. For example, Ferranti adopted a mass production strategy after comparing current production costs with American data on unit costs at higher production levels (see Table 1 ). This involved setting prices at initially loss-making levels, to achieve long production runs and, therefore, scale economies in what was anticipated to be a rapidly expanding market. lxxiii lxxiv EMI followed a similar strategy, launching a project to produce the cheapest TV set on the market (to sell at £45, inclusive of current Purchase Tax) in 1948. This would involve a production cost of £15, which was believed possible only on a production run of at least 100,000. However, owing to the government restrictions EMI repeatedly found itself left with obsolete stock of each production run, which it had been unable to sell before the next generation of models became available.
[ Table 1 here]
The imposition of a one third minimum deposit and 18 months maximum HP contract term in the 1952 budget substantially narrowed the market for televisions, given that the cheapest cost around £60, including Purchase Tax, (equivalent to almost seven weeks' earnings for average male industrial workers aged 21 or over). lxxvi lxxv The Chancellor had recommended that during 1952 the value of radio and TV output should be cut by 25 per cent -to redeploy production capacity to defence needs. However, the HP restrictions produced an output reduction of about 40 per cent compared to the previous year, while even a 25 per cent reduction was estimated to inflate unit costs by 7.5-10 per cent.
Following the 1953 Purchase Tax reduction a new 'go' phase ensued, with demand exceeding capacity and shortages developing (compounded by a shift of demand from 9 and 12 inch screens to 14 and 15 inch sets which sold at the price charged for the smaller sets prior to the Purchase Tax cut). G.E.C. was rumoured to have 4,000 sets awaiting tubes and retailers reported having to wait 4-6 weeks for sets and considerably longer for tubes and repairs. Market saturation should have made it easier to predict demand and smooth production seasonality, using production planning, dealer 'stocking' schemes, and the introduction of new models during off-peak periods. However, such methods proved futile in the face of unanticipated changes in government restrictions. In late 1959 manufacturers were aware that market saturation would produce a fall in demand and had planned output accordingly. However, the reimposition of credit restrictions served to build up stocks before these lower production targets came into effect, forcing manufacturers to cut production to uneconomic levels. As a 1960 BREMA memorandum noted: 'Production schedules… call for large-scale investment planned well ahead, and cannot be cut-back suddenly without very serious disruption… throughout the chain of supply…' lxxxiii The memorandum claimed that, unless government took immediate steps, the financial stability of manufacturers and distributors would be imperilled, undermining the industry's ability to compete internationally.
Over the year to 30th September 1960 manufacturers' stocks of televisions rose from 157,000 to 636,000. 
Section IV
The literature on consumer durables distinguishes between 'entertainment' and 'labour-saving' durables. Labour-saving durables are generally found to have much slower diffusion rates than entertainment durables (reflecting the lower priority households attach to them); together with slower product cycles and obsolescence. lxxxix In order to examine the extent to which HP restrictions and Purchase Tax changes impacted on UK sales across consumer durables, we look at the largest class of entertainment durables, televisions, and a representative high-ticket household durable, washing machines. Most previous economic analysis of stop-go impacts on consumer durables has focused on the car market. xc However, impacts of HP restrictions are inherently much more difficult to model for cars than for televisions or white goods. In addition to a substantial business demand, most new private cars were purchased using bank loans, or by using the well-developed trade-in market to cover much or all of the deposit. Moreover, prior to 1955 shortages of supply for the home market created long waiting lists for new cars. Total, rather than HP, sales are chosen both for reasons of data availability and because we are principally interested in the impact of policy on affected industries, rather than just on their HP trade. We examine both changes in minimum HP deposit requirements and maximum contract terms. xcii We further include the Purchase Tax rate and, from its introduction in February 1956, the 'rental minimum down-payment' (the number of months' rental that had to be paid up-front for rented TV's, a measure introduced to deter evasion of the HP restrictions). Estimates of the number of people who could receive a television signal are also included (separately for the BBC and ITV as, while ITV transmitters covered territories already served by the BBC, the launch of ITV is known to have boosted set diffusion).
Unit sales in the current period, , are modelled as being determined by their prior values ( and ), the average price of a television in the two previous periods ( ), quarterly cycle movements of the economy (measured by quarterly consumers' expenditure in current market prices) xciii , and , and the key variables of interest -the series of events listed above relating to changes in HP restrictions, taxes, transmission coverage, plus variables capturing annual trends -via a year trend and coverage ( ), dummies for each month:
where is the error term.
Event dummies for introductions, changes, and removals of the three stop-go instruments -HP restrictions (minimum deposits and maximum contract terms), changes in Purchase Tax rates;
and rental minimum down payments -enable us to look at impacts in specific months. While the timings of Purchase Tax changes and HP restrictions do not regularly coincide, in half of the 12 instances where minimum HP deposits, or maximum contract terms, are adjusted, both are changed simultaneously. Changes in rental minimum down payments also mainly coincide with changes in maximum contract terms.
The results, shown in We test for unit roots using an augment Dickey Fuller test, including constant and trend components (given the data clearly has a trend). We are able to reject the hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Similarly, the Breusch-Godfrey test implies that we have no problems of serial correlation.
[ Table 2 here]
Of the two classic high-ticket labour-saving household durables of this era, washing machines and refrigerators, we selected electric washing machines for analysis. As Figure 2 shows, washing machines displayed a broadly similar diffusion pattern to refrigerators, but diffused somewhat faster (as refrigerators were an outlier among labour-saving durables in terms of their high purchase and running costs). Furthermore, unlike refrigerators, monthly unit sales data for electric washing machines are available for the full period of analysis. Unfortunately monthly data on the value of sales are not available until 1957, though annual data are available from 1954, enabling us to compose an annual price index. As sales and values are very highly correlated (99.5%) they provide close proxies in this case.
[Figure 2 here]
We again include minimum HP deposit terms, maximum HP contract lengths, and Purchase Tax rates. Figure 3 shows the evolution of these variables and maps the dates of changes in Purchase Tax rates and HP introductions, changes, and withdrawals. While they are notably less variable than TV sales, there is nevertheless substantial seasonal variation and a clear trend in annual sales.
[ Figure 3 here]
The findings, in successful. Yet, just as the long-term growth of the City and other sectors associated with Britain's international role (such as oil and defence-related engineering) cannot be explained without taking account of their consistent prioritisation by government, the flip side of this policy -active discrimination against other sectors -should not be ignored in accounts of their decline.
Financial retrenchment hit all manufacturing sectors, through periodic restrictions on bank lending and capital issues, though its impact was particularly severe on the consumer durables industries, that were forced to bear most of the burden of adjustment in consumer demand. We have shown not only that this policy inflicted severe direct damage on these industries, but that some problems commonly seen as root causes of their declining competitiveness -such as deteriorating industrial relations and failures to reach minimum efficient scale or maintain capacity output -were at least exacerbated by the restrictions.
The Bank of England and Treasury had successfully pushed a policy that essentially involved favouring one group of sectors -associated with banking, finance, and international trade, at the expense of another -associated with manufacturing and, particularly, high ticket consumer durables. This had a number of long-term consequences for British economic development, boosting the growth of the City and the wider London area at the expense of Britain's provincial regions and increasing Britain's reliance on a relatively narrow base of internationally-orientated service industries.
Our findings also qualify the depiction of the 1950s as an era of "affluence" for the working-classes.
Formal rationing, which effected all sections of the population, was replaced by a less transparent system of credit rationing, that impacted most severely on those sections of society without bank or department store accounts. By limiting access to credit, government severely restricted the access of lower income families to some of the key status-related goods of the post-war era, such as cars, televisions and white goods, and effectively forced such households to bear much of the burden of financial retrenchment. Sources: see Table 2 .
Notes: T = purchase tax; D = deposit rates; MP = Maximum repayment -the length of the period in months is provided in brackets. Arrow indicated increases and decreases in deposits, repayment periods and '-' indicates where there is no change. Details on each intervention are located in Appendix 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Washers Sources: see Table 3 . 1960-1966 (1960-1966) .
Notes: see table 2. 
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